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1.1. Overview  
 
The aim of this legal opinion is to give a definition of the right to property from a human rights 
perspective. A survey of the right to property in international law, regional instruments and national 
constitutions will be followed by an analysis of the scope and content of the right to property and 
correlative States’ obligations. Special attention will be paid to the role of the right to property in the 
realization of other human rights, in particular the rights to food, adequate housing and social 
security. Existing jurisprudence at the international, regional and national levels and doctrinal 
opinion will be used to define the right to property from a human rights perspective. 
 
1.2. Genesis of the Right to Property and Certain Recurrent Issues 
 
The right to property can be traced to the early philosophical writings leading to the French 
Revolution’s Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen2 and the US Bill of Rights3.  Long after 
the first 18th century developments, the classification of the right to property as a human right 
continued to raise controversies.  
 
One of the grounds for debate is the fact that property has been a privilege of the few and served in 
the past as a means of excluding the large mass of non-possessors from social and political life.4 The 
merit of this argument is that it pinpoints an intrinsic tension between the right to property as a civil 
liberty and its social function. The right to property, understood as a means of survival, is closely 
related to the realization of the right to life and of other human rights of the individual. At the same 
time, however, its limitation may be necessary for the realization of other human rights of other 
individuals.5 Western liberal tradition places this right among other freedoms, while its 
characteristics unequivocally would lead to its inclusion among economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
Another line of argumentation suggests that certain characteristics of property, such as the 
possibility to sell, trade or destroy it, are in conflict with the inalienability principle characteristic of 
human rights.6 This kind of interpretation is perhaps tributary to a view of human rights solely 
through the lenses of civil and political rights. A comparison with economic, social and cultural rights 
– for example the right to food, where food itself can be sold, traded or destroyed – would make 
critics feel more at ease with the right to property as a human right, despite the alienable 
                                                          
 
2
 Article 2 of the Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen, 1789, reads: “Le but de toute association politique est la 
conservation des droits naturels et imprescriptibles de l’homme. Ces droits sont la liberté, la propriété, la sûreté et la 
résistance à l’oppression.” Article 17 reads: “La propriété étant un droit inviolable et sacré, nul ne peut en être privé, si ce 
n’est lorsque la nécessité publique, légalement constatée, l’exige évidemment, et sous la condition d’une juste et préalable 
indemnité.” 
3
 Amendment V of the US Bill of Rights states that: “No person shall (…) be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
4
 F. Cheneval, “Property Rights as Human Rights”, in H. de Soto and F. Cheneval, Realizing Property Rights, Rueffer & Rub, 
Swiss Human Rights Book, Vol. I, 2006, at 11.  
5
 For an example, see E. Wickeri and A. Kalhan, Land Rights Issues in International Human Rights Law, Institute for Human 
Rights and Business.  
6
 F. Cheneval, “Property Rights as Human Rights”, at 11. 
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characteristics of property. Beyond the theoretical discussion, the dual nature of the right has 
therefore important implications.7 
 
 
THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, REGIONAL 
TREATIES AND NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
 
 
Despite persisting controversies, the formal inclusion of the right to property among the panoply of 
human rights, and therefore its legal basis, is clearly attested by several international and regional 
human rights instruments, as well as numerous national constitutions.  
 
2.1. Universal Human Rights Instruments 
 
A chronological approach to the international human rights instruments that proclaim the right to 
property must start with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which in 1948 
proclaimed in its Article 17 that “[e]veryone has the right to own property alone as well as in 
association with others” and that “*n+o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”8 It is 
important to note that: the right applies to both individual and collective forms of ownership; unlike 
preceding drafts, the final article does not make any explicit mention to limitations of the right to 
property9; and the right is however not absolute, since deprivation of property is possible if such 
action is not arbitrary. 
 
Adopted three years later, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, while not spelling out 
the right as such, contains several provisions concerning movable and immovable property rights of 
refugees.10 These provisions were mirrored in the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons adopted in 1954.11 In accordance with the general agreement existing at that time on the 
right to property as a human right, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination adopted in 1965 stipulates a general undertaking of State parties to eliminate 
racial discrimination and guarantee “the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others” (Art. 5(v)), without entering into any discussion on limitations.  
 
In this context, it is surprising that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both adopted in 
1966, are silent on the right to property.12 A study of the travaux préparatoires explains that this 
silence, as Eibe Riedel suggested, originates in the antagonistic ideological views of the Western and 
Eastern blocs, as well as those of the North and South.13 It also clarifies that the non-inclusion of the 
                                                          
 
7
 See infra on the absence of the right to property from the two international Covenants adopted in 1966. See also C. 
Krause, “The Right to Property”, in A. Eide, C. Krause, and  A. Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Textbook., 2nd revised ed., The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001, at 192-193. 
8
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948, Art. 17(1) and (2).  
9
 See C. Krause, and G. Alfredsson, “Article 17”, in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide (eds.), The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999 359-378, at 364. 
10
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees adopted in 1951, Arts 13, 18, 19, 29 and 30.  
11
 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons adopted in 1954, Arts 13, 18, 19, 29 and 30.   
12
 On the duality of the right and the discussion on whether it should have been included in the ICCPR or the ICESCR, see A. 
Rosas, “Property Rights”, in A. Rosas, J.E. Helgesen, D. Goodman, The Strength of Diversity: Human Rights and Pluralist 
Democracy, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, 133-158, at 138. 
13
 E. Riedel, Theorie der Menschenrechtsstandards, Berlin, Duncker & Humbolt, 1986, at 39.  
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right to property in the Covenants can by no means be equated with the denial of the right.14 In fact, 
at its tenth session, the Commission on Human Rights approved the first sentence of the draft article 
on the right to property as follows: “The States Parties to this Covenant undertake to respect the 
right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with others”.15 But objections 
persisted on the limitations of the right and restrictions of State action, in particular expropriation. 
The Annotations on the text of the draft International Covenants on Human Rights summarize best 
the mindset of the drafters: “(…) no one questioned the right of the individual to own property (…) it 
was generally admitted that the right to own property was not absolute” and “there was wide 
agreement that the right (…) was subject to some degree of control by the State” while “certain 
safeguards against abuse must be provided.”16 Despite this consensual background, ideological and 
regional differences could not be bridged on the matter of limitations. The Commission on Human 
Rights adjourned the consideration of the issue sine die. As a result, property only appears in both 
Covenants as part of the non-discrimination clause.17 
 
Several other core human rights treaties adopted after 1966 refer to property rights, despite the 
non-inclusion of the right to property in the two Covenants. Most of these instruments oblige States 
parties to ensure equality in respect to property ownership. Articles 15(2) and 16(1)(h) of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted 
in 1979, proclaim the equal treatment of women and men in respect to ownership of property. The 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families, adopted in 1990, has the most detailed property clause, including conditions for 
permissible State interference:   
No migrant worker or member of his or her family shall be arbitrarily deprived of property, 
whether owned individually or in association with others. Where, under the legislation in 
force in the State of employment, the assets of a migrant worker or a member of his or her 
family are expropriated in whole or in part, the person concerned shall have the right to fair 
and adequate compensation. (Art. 15) 
 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities contains clauses on property rights under 
Articles 5(3) and 30(3). The latter provision is an acknowledgement of the necessary limitations of 
intellectual property rights as a means of realizing other human rights of persons with disabilities.18  
 
Finally, the 1989 International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples recognizes the rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the 
land they traditionally occupy, and the States’ obligation to identify this land and guarantee effective 
protection of their rights of ownership and possession (Art. 14). Where the relocation of these 
                                                          
 
14
 See UN Docs. E/CN.4/SR.230-232; E/CN.4/SR.302, 303; E/CN.4/SR.413-418. 
15
 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.417, 418. For a discussion see also E. Riedel, Theorie der Menschenrechtsstandards, at 39-45.  
16
 Annotations on the text of the draft International Covenants on Human Rights, 1 July 1995, UN Doc. A/2929, para. 197, 
202, 206. 
17
 ICCPR, Art. 2(1) provides that: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.” According to ICESCR, Art 2(2): “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 
18 
Article 30(3) reads: “States Parties shall take all appropriate steps, in accordance with international law, to ensure that 
laws protecting intellectual property rights do not constitute an unreasonable or discriminatory barrier to access by 
persons with disabilities to cultural materials.” For intellectual property rights and workers and labour-related property 
rights, see also Krause, “The Right to Property”, at 196.  
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peoples is necessary, it shall take place with their free and informed consent, and they shall be 
provided with lands of equal quality and legal status or be fully compensated (Art. 16). 
 
Soft-law instruments related to the right to property have been developed within the United Nations 
framework aiming to secure and safeguard property rights and related human rights. Some of these 
are evidence of the intrinsic link between the right to property, the right to housing and land rights. 
The United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution, known as the Pinheiro principles, 
which have been endorsed by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights in 2005, are of particular relevance in the context of displacement.19 The Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement developed by the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the right to housing are also relevant. 20 
 
Although it goes beyond the scope of this study, it should be noted that provisions of international 
humanitarian law offer protection to property rights in times of armed conflict.21   
 
2.2. Regional Human Rights Instruments 
 
In addition to the provisions discussed above concerning property rights at the universal level, the 
right to property is also recognized in regional human rights instruments.  
The right to property has not been enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, commonly referred to as the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)22, but the first Article of its first Protocol, adopted in 1952, is entitled the “Protection of 
Property”. It recognizes that:  
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.  
 
The second paragraph of the same article provides the right of a State party “to enforce such laws as 
it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” The context in which the ECHR and 
its Protocol No. 1 have been drafted – in the aftermath of authoritarian rule and abuse of power by 
the State – explains the need for safeguards on State actions. At the same time, States were aware 
of the social function that the right to property fulfils, and they were reluctant to submit political 
decisions, on issues such as expropriation or nationalization, to judicial review.23 However, at the 
end of the negotiations, it was felt that the balanced outcome, although not totally satisfactory, 
                                                          
 
19
 Housing and property restitution in the context of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons: Final report of 
the Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17, 28 June 2005. 
20 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, 
Miloon Kothari, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/18, 5 February 2007, Annex 1. Other relevant soft-law instruments include the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement developed by the first Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of 
internally displaced persons, F. Deng, in 1998 (UN Doc. E/CN/41998/53/Add.2) and the Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/147. 
21
 See for example Art. 46 of the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907, and 
Article 53, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949.  
22 
On the debate as to whether to include the right to property in the ECHR, see Krause, “The Rights to Property”, at 194. 
More generally on the competing visions of States and the different institutions of the Council of Europe during the 
drafting process of the ECHR, see S. C. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, at 18-19. 
23
 T.R.G. Van Banning, The Human Right to Property, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002, at 79. 
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could be clarified in the future through jurisprudence.24 Indeed, as we will see below, the vast 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR) is essential in understanding the 
content of the right and its relation with other rights. As an example here, we can indicate that the 
ECrtHR made clear that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, using the term “possessions”, “is in substance 
guaranteeing the right of property.”25  
 
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) upholds the right of everyone to the “use and 
enjoyment of his property” and lays down the possibility of subordinating this right to the interest of 
society, while at the same time specifying the restrictions on State actions (Article 21).26 The term 
“subordinate” ought to be regarded as linguistic evidence of the view championed by Latin American 
States regarding the importance of the social function of property.27 Moreover, the novel third 
clause of the article, prohibiting “usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man”28, 
establishes a clear relationship between individuals in respect to property, limiting everyone’s right 
to property by the rights of others. It also clearly spells the duty of States to protect individuals 
against the property rights of others.29  
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) guarantees the right to property and 
outlines the public need and general interest of the community as legitimate grounds for limiting the 
right. The encroachment on the right must also be in “accordance with the provisions of appropriate 
laws”.30 Legal scholars argue that among the many clawback clauses which exist in the AfCHPR, 
Article 14 contains the most far-reaching one. As such, the safeguards on State action remain very 
weak.31 At the same time, it is suggested that the clause is legitimate given the colonial past and the 
pattern of exploitation to which Africa was subjected.32 Article 13(3) grants equal access to public 
property and services to every individual, which is particularly important in the African context.33 
Article 21 is also rooted in the colonial history of the continent, recognizing the right of all peoples to 
freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. Since its relevance might become increasingly 
appealing to litigators given, for example, the recent large land appropriations by foreign States or 
companies, it will be quoted in full: 
1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be 
exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of 
it.  
2. In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of 
its property as well as to an adequate compensation.  
                                                          
 
24
 T. R. G. van Banning, paraphrasing René Cassin, ibid, at 78-79.  
25 
Marckx v. Belgium, Application No. 6833/74, Judgment of 13 June 1979, para 63. The Court based its assertion on the 
employment of the expression “use of property” in the second paragraph of the article, as well as on the travaux 
préparatoires where the drafters consistently refer to the right to property.  
26
 These are “for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law” 
and compensation must be paid. American Convention on Human Rights adopted in 1969, Art. 21(1) and (2). 
27 
An analysis of the official records upholds this interpretation. T. R. G. van Banning, The Human Right to Property, at 62.  
28 
ACHR, Article 21(3). 
29
 T. R. G. van Banning, The Human Right to Property, at 62. 
30
 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981, Art. 14. 
31 
For a summary of scholars who share this view, see G. J. Naldi, “Limitation of Rights under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights: The Contribution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights”, 17 South African Journal 
on Human Rights, 2001 109-118. 
32
 C. A. Odinkalu, “Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights”, in M. D. Evans, and  R. Murray (eds.), The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: the system in practice, 
1986-2000, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, at 191.  
33
 E. A. Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Practice and Procedures, The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1996, at 142.  
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3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to 
the obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based on mutual 
respect, equitable exchange and the principles of international law.  
4. States parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the right 
to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening 
African unity and solidarity.  
 
States parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic 
exploitation particularly that practiced by international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to 
fully benefit from the advantages derived from their national resources.34 
 
Article 26(1) of the 1995 Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms35 generally follows the model set forth by other regional instruments 
stipulating the right to property subject to the usual limitations for deprivation, without however 
expressly mentioning the requirement of compensation.36 
 
The (Revised) Arab Charter of Human Rights, which recently entered into force, provides that 
“*e+veryone has a guaranteed right to own private property, and shall not under any circumstances 
be arbitrarily or unlawfully divested of all or any part of his property.”37 It appears that the “or” 
between “arbitrary” and “unlawful” suggest a disjunctive reading which could be in this case the 
equivalent of a clawback clause. The article being so general, it remains to be seen how the terms 
will be interpreted by the Arab Human Rights Committee and by a future Arab Court of Justice.  
Lastly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which became legally binding upon 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 follows the model of Article 1 of Protocol I to the 
ECHR in respect to the protection of the right to property.38 In addition, it expressly stipulates that 
deprivation is subject to fair compensation “paid in good time”.39 
 
2.3. National Constitutions 
 
It is not the intention and surely beyond the capacity of this legal opinion to review the constitutions 
of all States. Based on sources that have extensively dealt with the topic40, some patterns and some 
                                                          
 
34
 AfCHPR, Art. 21.  
35
 The Commonwealth of Independent States Convention has raised controversies regarding the substantive and 
procedural protection it offers to human rights as well as in relation to the compatibility with the ECHR. See Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1249, 2001, “Coexistence of the Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the European Convention on Human Rights”. 
The ECrtHR concluded that it had no competence to give an advisory opinion on the coexistence of the two instruments, 
see ECrtHR, Decision on the Competence of the Court to Give an Advisory Opinion, 2 June 2004. 
36
 Meaning: “in the public interest, under a judicial procedure and in accordance with the conditions laid down in national 
legislation and the generally recognized principles of international law.” Commonwealth of Independent States Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 26(1). The second paragraph of Article 26 is rather unique and its 
application has not made the object of interpretation by the monitoring body of the Convention. It reads as follow: 
“However, the foregoing provisions shall in no way affect the right of the Contracting Parties to adopt such laws as they 
deem necessary to control the use of items withdrawn from general circulation in the national or public interest.” 
37
 Arab Charter on Human Rights adopted in 2004, Art. 31. 
38




 T. R. G. van Banning discusses the provisions of national Constitutions in respect of property rights extensively. T. R. G. 
van Banning, The Human Right to Property, at 139-146. See also Tom Allan, The Right to Property in Commonwealth 
Constitutions, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000, at 36-82; The right of everyone to own property alone as well as in 
association with others: Completed final report submitted by Mr. Luis Valencia Rodríquez, Independent Expert, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/19, 25 November 1993.  
 
8 Legal Opinion: The Right to Property from a Human Rights Perspective 
 
 
examples of constitutional clauses on property rights in both common and civil law systems will be 
discussed. Whereas the right to property appears to be the most often codified right in national 
constitutions, a variety of forms of codification can be observed, reaching from very detailed and 
context-specific provisions41 to general clauses.42 Of particular importance for this legal opinion is 
the fact that social aspects are comprised by constitutional clauses, and if so, in what way. As van 
Banning and others assert, many constitutions refer to what can be termed as social aspects: the 
“social function”43, the realization of other human rights in general, and socio-economic rights in 
particular. Moreover, some constitutions spell out the obligations of the State to protect and fulfil 
the right to property.44  
 
Article 25 of the South African Constitution, adopted in 1996, is an elaborate example of the right to 
property functioning as a means of realizing other human rights, as well as of the role the State must 
play in this process.45 Property is guaranteed by the Constitution and “no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation”.46 Expropriation is permitted, if prescribed by law, in the public interest or for a public 
purpose and it is subject to compensation.47 Paragraph 4 defines the public interest as including “the 
nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South 
Africa’s natural resources”. Detailed provisions are outlined in respect to compensation so as to 
reflect “an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected”.48 
Paragraph 5 spells out the duty of the State to fulfil the right to property in respect to land: “The 
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster 
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.” The person or 
community whose tenure of land is insecure as a consequence of apartheid is entitled “either to 
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.”49 Paragraph 8 spells the positive obligation 
of the State to enact legislation to give effect to the latter provision. Lastly, the Constitution 
proclaims a right to restitution for those who suffered forced removal during the apartheid regime.50  
                                                          
 
41
 For example, the article on the right to property of the Romanian Constitution of 1991, as amended in 2003 (Art. 44(4)), 
is to be understood in the context of the fall of communism where nationalization of property was based on criteria such 
as religion or political views. In addition, in the view of the accession to the European Union a clause has been introduced 
which reverses the previous prohibition of foreigners to own property, conditioning the right to property by the EU 
Accession Treaty stipulations and reciprocal conditions of other international treaties (Art.44(2)). For another context 
specific example, see the Constitution of China as amended in 2004, which has clauses on both private property and public 
property (Art. 12 and 13). For a very detailed article on the right to property, see Article 27 of the Constitution of Mexico, 
adopted in 1917. 
42
 The Swiss Constitution adopted in 1999 offers an example of a clause phrased in general terms: “1. La propriété est 
garantie. 2. Une pleine indemnité est due en cas d’expropriation ou de restriction de la propriété qui équivaut à une 
expropriation.” 
43
 Van Banning defines the social function as the obligation of the owner to use the property for the satisfaction of his 
needs but also the collective needs of society; as such, it refers to the rules regulating the relationship between the needs 
of the individual and the needs of society. The term predates the UDHR and the ICESCR and while related it should not be 
confused with a social right.  T. R. G. van Banning, The Human Right to Property, at 147-148. 
44
 Ibid, at 147. See for example the Constitution of South Africa, Articles 7 and 25. See also The Human Rights Resource 
Center, The Circle of Rights, Module 18 – Land rights.  
45
 The context in which the South African Constitution was adopted is essential. Geoff Budlendert notes that “forced 
removals were the only form of apartheid injustice which the new government was specifically instructed to redress as a 
matter of constitutional obligation”, arguing that the resolution of land claims are of central importance in the process of 
national reconciliation. G. Budlender, “Restitution of Housing and Property Rights: Some Lessons from the South-African 
Experience”, 19 Refugee Survey Quarterly 3, 2000, at 224. 
46
 South African Constitution of 1996, Art. 25 (1). 
47
 Ibid, Art. 25 (2). 
48
 Ibid, Art. 25 (3). 
49
 Ibid, Art. 25 (6). 
50
 Ibid, Art. 25 (7). 
 
Legal Opinion: The Right to Property from a Human Rights Perspective 9 
 
 
The Constitution of Brazil represents another clear example where the right to property has been 
interpreted as a modality of furthering other social and economic rights. The drafters explicitly 
mention the social function of property among the terms that qualify the inviolability of property51 
and go on to stipulate that: 
It is within the power of the union to expropriate on account of social interest, for purposes 
of agrarian reform, the rural property which is not performing its social function, against 
prior and fair compensation in agrarian debt bonds with a clause providing for maintenance 
of the real value, redeemable within a period of up to twenty years computed as from the 
second year of issue, and the use of which shall be defined in the law.52  
 
There is no doubt that agrarian reform is a necessary step in realizing the right to food and the right 
to social security of small farmers and landless workers in Brazil53 and it is with this intention that 
the drafters of the Constitution put forward this limitation of the right to property. In addition to the 
articles that stipulate the social function of urban property and allow for expropriation under certain 
conditions54, Article 183 of the Brazilian Constitution states that: 
An individual who possesses an urban area of up to two hundred and fifty square meters, for 
five years, without interruption or opposition, using it as his or as his family’s home, shall 
acquire domain of it, provided that he does not own any other urban or rural property.  
 
The interplay between the right to housing and the right to property is very important here. While 
expropriation represents a limitation of the right to property so as to further the right to housing of 
others, the acquiring of property rights – hence a strengthening of the property regime – when 
previously no such rights existed, can again lead to the realization of the right to housing.  
 
While the social function of property is said to be a constitutional development in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America during the last decades55, limitations based on social aspects of the right to property 
can also be found in Western Constitutions. The Constitution of Ireland, for example, after 
recognizing that the right to property is fundamental, admits that “the exercise of [the right to 
property] ought, in civil society, to be regulated by the principles of social justice” and that “*t+he 
State, accordingly, may as occasion requires delimit by law the exercise of the said rights with a view 
to reconciling their exercise with the exigencies of the common good.”56 Germany’s Grundgesetz 
states that: “Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.”57  Lastly, one 
should regard the prohibition of monopolies and the correlative duty of the State to protect in the 
context of the right to property’s social function. And indeed, the United States has enacted 




                                                          
 
51
 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 5 October 1988, with the alterations introduced by Constitutional 
Amendments No. 1/92 through 57/08 and by Revision Constitutional Amendments No. 1/94 through 6/94, Article 5(XXIII). 
52
 Ibid, Art. 184. See also Art. 186. 
53
 See Report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Mr. Jean Ziegler, on his mission to Brazil, UN Doc. 
E/CN4/2003/54/Add1, 3 January 2003. 
54
 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 5 October 1988, Art. 182.  
55
 The Human Rights Resource Center, Circle of Rights.  
56
 Bunreacht Na hÉireann of 1937, Article 43.2(1) and 2(2). (Emphases added.) 
57
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 1949, as amended 
by the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 and Federal Statute of 23 September 1990, Art. 14(2). 
58
 For other examples of social aspects in the US property rights system, see G. S. Alexander, “The Social-Obligation Norm 
in American Property Law”, 94 Cornell Law Review, 2008 746 - 819. 
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2.4. The Customary Law Character of the Right to Property 
 
The review of provisions of international instruments, regional treaties and national constitutions 
reveal the universal recognition of the human right to property. It appears that generalized and 
consistent State practice and opinio juris reflect the customary nature of the first paragraph of 
Article 17 of the UDHR “*e+veryone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others”. The universal acceptance of general interest as a lawful limitation to the right to property 
(provided certain other conditions are met, as will be discussed in Part III), as illustrated by the 
concept of eminent domain itself, places the social function of property – which guarantees the 
realization of the core content of other economic, social and cultural rights – in the realm of 
customary norms.59 While preempting the further analysis, it can be said that stipulations of 
international and regional instruments, as well as the interpretation attributed to these by the 
supervisory bodies, in addition to the convergent juridical opinion of scholars and the evidence 
provided by consensually adopted resolutions of the UN General Assembly suggest that the payment 
of compensation in cases of unlawful and lawful deprivation of property has become a requirement 
of customary international law.   
 
The controversial aspect that remains debated to these days refers to the standard of compensation 
applicable in cases of lawful expropriation. Section 3.4 of this study deals at length with this issue by 
looking at compensation and the general principles of international law.  
                                                          
 
59
 See for example W. B. Stoebuck’s attempt to trace the historical and theoretical development of the concept of eminent 
domain, i.e. a taking of private property by the state in the general interest. W. B. Stoebuck, “A General Theory of Eminent 
Domain”, 47 Washington Law Review 4, (1972), 553-608. 
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THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND 
CORRELATIVE STATES’ OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
After the description of the provisions on the right to property in universal, regional and national 
instruments, we can conclude that the general acceptance of the right to property is beyond doubt. 
But the definition of the right to property varies in the different legal instruments, in particular with 
regard to its limitations, the allowed balancing of interests and the clauses on social aspects. We 
must therefore conclude that “the content of the right to property ultimately remains a question of 
interpretation by the supervisory organs”.60 In this third part, the object, scope and content of this 
right, as well as the right holders, the standard of compensation and the correlative States’ 
obligations, will be defined with the help of a jurisprudential analysis. 
 
3.1. The Object of the Right 
 
None of the universal and regional instruments discussed offers a clear-cut definition of the object 
of the right, i.e. property or, in the language of the ECHR, “possessions”.  
 
In the absence of the right to property being stipulated by the ICCPR, its supervisory organ – the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) – has not dealt with the right directly.61 The extent to which the 
jurisprudence of the HRC is informative in relation to the content of the right is therefore minimal. 
Regional supervisory bodies, in contrast to international bodies, have been more prolific in this area.   
 
The ECrtHR has given the term “possessions” a wide interpretation. Two important aspects ought to 
be mentioned here. First, the term may refer to “existing possessions” or assets, including claims in 
respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of 
obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right.”62 It is clear however that the Court does not see 
any right to acquire property, as arising under the Protocol or the Convention.63 The Court takes the 
view that “the hope of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise 
effectively” and “conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition” lie 
outside the meaning of possessions of Article 1 of Protocol No.1.64 In Malhous vs. the Czech Republic, 
the Court concluded that Mr. Malhous could not have had any “legitimate expectation” of realizing 
his claim to restitution of his father’s property, given that under the Land Ownership Act only those 
plots which were in the possession of the State or of a legal person could be returned, as opposed to 
those which had in the meantime been assigned to natural persons.65  
 
                                                          
 
60
 C. Krause, “The Right to Property", at 196. 
61
 See for example Kéténguéré Ackla v. Togo, Communication No. 505/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/505/1992, 1996, para 
6.3, in which “the Committee noted that, irrespective of the fact that the confiscation took place prior to the date of entry 
into force of the Optional Protocol for Togo, the right to property was not protected by the Covenant. Accordingly, the 
Committee decided that this claim was inadmissible ratione materiae, under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.” 
62
 Maltzan and others v. Germany, Applications nos. 71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02, Decision of 2 March 2005, para 74 
(c); Kopecký v. Slovakia, Application No. 44912/98, Judgment of 28 September 2004, 35(c).   
63
 See Slivenko and Others v. Latvia, Application no. 48321/99, Decision of 23 January 2002, para 121; Van der Mussele v. 
Belgium, Application no. 8919/80, Judgment of 23 November 1983, para 46. 
64
 Maltzan and others v. Germany, Applications Nos. 71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02, Decision of 2 March 2005, para 
74 (c); Kopecký v. Slovakia, Application No. 44912/98, Judgment of 28 September 2004, 35(c).   
65
 Malhous v. the Czech Republic, Application No. 33071/96, Decision of 13 December 2000. See also Case of Prince Hans-
Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, Application No. 42527/98, Judgment of 12 July 2001, para 83. 
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Looking at the object of the right to property, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR) 
took a similar approach in the Five Pensioners case, in so far as it established the need for an 
“acquired” right in accordance with enacted legislation to exist66, or in the words of the Inter-
American Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, “an asset that formed part of the patrimony of 
the alleged victims”.67  
 
According to the IACrtHR, the “possession” of indigenous people is of a special character, since the 
“acquired by law” character is more lax: 
1. Traditional possession of their lands by indigenous people has equivalent effects to those of a 
state-granted full property title. 
2. Traditional possession entitles indigenous peoples to demand official recognition and 
registration of property title. 
3. The members of indigenous people who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost 
possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even though they lack legal title, unless 
the lands have been lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith; and 
4. The members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly lost possession of their lands, 
when those lands have been lawfully transferred to innocent third parties, are entitled to 
restitution thereof or to obtain other lands of equal extension and quality. Consequently, 
possession is not a requisite conditioning the existence of indigenous land restitution rights.68 
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights gave an almost identical interpretation to 
the property rights of indigenous people, when it concluded in its recent Endorois case that 
“possession is not a requisite condition for the existence of indigenous land restitution rights.” 69 
 
The second aspect in respect to the object of property refers to its “autonomous meaning”.70 The 
ECrtHR held that property covers both movable and immovable property, and is not limited to 
physical goods, nor is it dependent on formal classification in domestic law.71 Decisions of the Court 
have held that property includes, for example, contractual rights with economic value72, professional 
clientèle73, goodwill74, entitlement to compensation if certain criteria are met75 and future income if 
it has been earned or is “definitely payable”.76  
                                                          
 
66
 “Five Pensioners” v. Peru, Judgment of 28 February 2003, para 103.  
67
 Ibid, para 90. 
68
 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 29 March 2006, para 128. 
69
 The relevant paragraph from the Commission’s decision reads as follows: “(1) traditional possession of land by 
indigenous people has the equivalent effect as that of a state-granted full property title; (2) traditional possession entitles 
indigenous people to demand official recognition and registration of property title; (3) the members of indigenous peoples 
who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even though 
they lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith; and (4) the members of 
indigenous peoples who have unwillingly lost possession of their lands, when those lands have been lawfully transferred to 
innocent third parties, are entitled to restitution thereof or to obtain other lands of equal extension and quality.” Centre 
for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. 
Kenya, Communication No. 276 / 2003, May 2009, para 209. 
70
 Iatridis v. Greece, Application no. 31107/96, Judgment of 25 March 1999, para 54; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001, para 146. 
71
 See ECrtHR, The Concept of “Possessions”, Key Case-Law Issues, 23 January 2007. See also A. Grgid, Z. Mataga, M. Longar 
and A. Vilfan, The right to property under the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Handbook No. 10, 
Council of Europe, June 2007, at 6-9. 
72
 C. Krause, “The Right to Property”, at 199. 
73
 In Van Marle and Others v. The Netherlands, Application no. 8543/79; 8674/79; 8675/79; 8685/79, Judgment of 26 June 
1986, para 41, the Court held that “by dint of their own work, the applicants had built up a clientèle; this had in many 
respects the nature of a private right and constituted an asset and, hence, a possession within the meaning of the first 
sentence of Article 1 (P1-1)”. 
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The IACrtHR, similarly, takes a wide view of the meaning of property: 
[T]he term “property” used in said Article 21 includes “those material things which can be 
possessed, as well as any right which may be part of a person’s patrimony; that concept 
includes all movables and immovables, corporeal and incorporeal elements and any other 
intangible object capable of having value”77 
 
In its recent decision in the Endorois case, the African Commission, while considering the 
autonomous meaning of property rights, recalled its views in the Ogoni case, where it found that the 
right to property “includes not only the right to have access to one’s property and not to have one’s 
property invaded or encroached upon, but also the right to undisturbed possession, use and control 
of such property however the owner(s) deem fit.”78 It then goes on to take note of the ECrtHR 
practice according to which “property rights could also include the economic resources and rights 
over the common land of the applicants.”79 
 
As evidenced by the jurisprudence of the regional supervisory bodies, it appears straightforward and 
unquestionable that one of the key objects of property is land.  
 
3.2. The Right Holders 
 
The holders of the right to property under the ECHR are natural and legal persons. In Article 21, the 
ACHR recognizes the right of everyone to property. Following the precedent set by the Inter-
American Commission80, the IACrtHR has interpreted the provisions of this article as allowing for a 
communal or collective right of indigenous people, basing itself on the special spiritual link between 
indigenous people and their lands and their system of land ownership, which is not centered on an 
individual but on the group and its community.81 In its decision in the Moiwana case, in 2005, the 
Court extended the notion of collective property rights beyond indigenous people, hence 
recognizing other groups of individuals as right holders.82 The Court has upheld this position in a 
more recent case.83 
 





 Malhous v. the Czech Republic, Application no. 33071/96, Decision of 13 December 2000. 
76
 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, Application no. 73049/01, Judgment of 11 January 2007, para 64. 
77
 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 17 June 2005, para 137.  
78
 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare 




 See F. MacKay, “From ‘Sacred Commitment’ to Justiciable Norms: Indigenous Peoples Rights in the Inter-American 
System”, in A. Tostensen and W. Vandenhole (eds.), Casting the Net Wider – Human Rights and Development in the 21st 
Century, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2007, 371-394, at 374–378. 
81
 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001, para 148 and 153, 149; Yakye Axa 
Indigenous Community, Judgment of 17 June 2005, para 143. 
82
 N’Djuka clans are a community of Maroons, descendants of African slaves which settled in the Moiwana Village in the 
late 19
th
 century. This ethnic community did not possess legal title to the land inhabited and Suriname argued that the 
property belonged to the State. While admitting that the N’Djuka did not constitute an indigenous people the Court held, 
after hearing testimonies from anthropologists that the groups “all-encompassing relationship” to their traditional lands 
through a system of communal ownership entitled them to a collective right to property that the State was under a duty to 
recognize. Comunidad Moiwana Vs. Suriname, Sentencia, 15 de junio de 2005, para 132, 134. See also K. de Feyter, “Treaty 
Interpretation and the Social Sciences”, in F. Coomans, F. Grünfeld, and  M. T. Kamminga (eds.), Methods of Human Rights 
Research, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2009, at 228-229. 
83
 Saramaka People. v. Suriname, Judgment of 28 November 2007, para 102. 
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Article 14 of the AfCHPR does not specify a subject of the right to property.84 However, its reading in 
light of Article 285 and the case-law of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights86, 
clarifies beyond question that every individual has the right to property under the Charter. In its 
recent case, after having established that the Endorois “are ‘a people’, a status that entitles them to 
benefit from provisions of the African Charter that protect collective rights”87, the Commission 
recognizes “the right to property with regard to its ancestral land, the possessions attached to it, and 
their animals” of the Endorois community.88 The African Commission thus explicitly acknowledges a 
right to communal property in the case of indigenous people.  
 
In light of historic discriminatory practices, women as property rights holders deserve special 
attention. In Marckx v. Belgium, a case concerning discriminatory inheritance practices, the ECrtHR 
found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 “by reason of the fact that an unmarried mother is 
not free to dispose of her property in favour of her child.” The Court’s comment is paradigmatic: 
In view of Article 14 of the Convention, the Court fails to see on what “general interest”, or 
on what objective and reasonable justification, a State could rely to limit an unmarried 
mother’s right to make gifts or legacies in favour of her child when at the same time a 
married woman is not subject to any similar restriction.89 
 
A number of relevant cases at national, regional and international levels deal, inter alia, with 
inheritance customary rights that discriminate between men and women, and with discriminatory 
provisions related to the administration of the communal property within marriage.90 
 
3.3. The Content of the Right to Property  
 
To define the right to property, the ECrtHR enunciated three rules in Sporrong and Lönnroth v. 
Sweden in 1982, which have become the fundamentals of the content of the right to property in the 
European system and are at the basis of an abundant jurisprudence in the field of property rights. 
According to the ECrtHR: 
Article (P1-1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is of a general nature, 
enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in the first sentence of 
the first paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to 
certain conditions; it appears in the second sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule 
recognizes that the States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property 
                                                          
 
84
 C. Krause, “The Right to Property”, at 199. 
85
 Article 2 of the AfCHPR provides that: “*e+very individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedom 
recognized and guaranteed in the *…+ Charter”.  
86
 See for example John K. Modise v. Botswana, Communication No. 97/93, 2000, para 94. 
87
 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare 
Council v. Kenya, Communication No. 276 / 2003, May 2009, para 161-162. 
88
 Ibid., para 184. 
89
 Marckx v. Belgium, Application No. 6833/74 of 13 June 1979, para 65. Article 14 of the ECHR reads: “the enjoyment of 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status”. 
90
 See for example Graciela Ato del Avellanal v. Peru, Communication No. 202/1986, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40, A/44/40, 
1998, at 196; Sonia Arce Esparza v. Chile, Case 71/01, Report No. 59/03. See also Report on the Rights of Women in Chile: 
Equality in the Family, Labour and Political Spheres, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134, Doc. 63, 27 March 2009, para 5. For several cases 
decided by the Supreme Court of India on customary law governing the transfer of property, see R. Emerton et al. (eds.), 
International Women's Rights Cases, London, Cavendish, 2005, at xxxv - xxxvii. 
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in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for 
the purpose; it is contained in the second paragraph.91 
 
Interference of property, while allowed, must satisfy certain conditions cumulatively: the principle of 
legality, a general or public interest character and a proportionality test. The principle of legality 
includes that interference must be prescribed by law, but the law must also be published and 
accessible and gather certain qualitative characteristics to be “compatible with the rule of law”.92 
The lawful interference of the individual’s property rights must also pass the test of legitimacy, in 
other words it needs to be pursued in the general or public interest. Under the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, the Court has in the past often deferred to the interpretation of general 
interest given by States in the context of property rights.93 In James v. the United Kingdom, the 
ECrtHR made a seminal assessment:  
Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are 
in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is “in the public 
interest”. (…) Furthermore, the notion of “public interest” is necessarily extensive. (…) *T+he 
decision to enact laws expropriating property will commonly involve consideration of 
political, economic and social issues on which opinions within a democratic society may 
reasonably differ widely. The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation 
available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide 
one, will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is “in the public interest” unless that 
judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation.94  
 
As we will see below, the notion of public or general interest, which allows a balance of interest to 
fulfill the social function of property, is therefore particularly significant in the context of the 
realization of economic and social rights (see Part IV). 
 
The condition of proportionality is also related to the general interest character of the interference. 
This refers to the reasonable relationship of proportionality which must exist between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realized. The ECrtHR takes the view that an instance of 
interference should strike “a ‘fair balance’ between the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights”.95 In 
practice, although the ECrtHR is said to have employed a lax standard of proportionality, variations 
are observable. In respect to the control of property (third rule) the Court sets the standard of 
proportionality at a lower level – consequently allowing for a wider margin of appreciation to States 
– than in cases related to deprivation or expropriation (second rule).96  
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 Sporrong and Lönnroth, Application no. 7151/75; 7152/75, Judgment of 23 September 1982, para 61. (Emphases added). 
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 James and others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 8793/79, Judgment of 21 February 1986, para 67. See also A. 
Grgid et al., The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights, at 12-13.  In a recent case, after having 
found that Romania’s restitution law is “surabondante et ... largement inefficace” the Court goes on to indicate, “*p]our 
aider l'État défendeur à remplir ses obligations au titre de l'article 46”, what normative and legislative measures should put 
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 See for example James and others v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 8793/79, Judgment of 21 February 1986; 
Former King of Greece and others v. Greece, Application No. 25701/94, Judgment of 23 November 2000. 
See also M. Hutchinson, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights”, 48 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 3, 2008, at 640. 
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 James and others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 8793/79, Judgment of 21 February 1986, para 46. For a 
commentary, see also M. Carss-Frisk, The Right to Property, Human Rights Handbooks No. 4, Council of Europe 2001, at 26-
28. 
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 Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, Application no. 10873/84, Judgment of 07 July 1989, para 46. 
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 Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the 
ECHR, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002, at 148. 
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While in the past the African Commission did not have the possibility to address the right to 
property in many cases97, recent jurisprudential developments are revealing in terms of the 
Commission’s interpretation of the content of this right stipulated by the African Charter. In the 
2009 Endorois case, the Commission dealt extensively with the right to property and set out a “two-
pronged test” entailing that an encroachment must be “in the interest of public need or in the 
general interest of the community” and “in accordance with appropriate laws” 98, the latter referring  
to both domestic and international law.99 At the same time, it set out that the limitations on 
property rights must be reviewed under the principle of proportionality, i.e. the interference with 
property rights must be “proportionate to a legitimate need, and should be the least restrictive 
measure possible.”100 Also, it would appear that the ancestral land of indigenous people belongs to a 
special category of property, and as the African judicial body puts it “*t+he ‘public interest’ test is 
met with a much higher threshold in the case of encroachment of indigenous land rather than 
individual private property. In this sense, the test is much more stringent when applied to ancestral 
land rights of indigenous people.”101  
 
3.4. Compensation and the General Principles of International Law 
 
As has been underlined, the issue of compensation in connection to the right to property has been a 
thorny one during the drafting process of several human rights instruments. Whereas the ACHR and 
the AfCHPR (albeit only in Article 21) have certain provisions on compensation, the European 
Convention and its First Protocol lack such provisions. For example, the IACrtHR based itself on the 
ACHR and on the “principle of international law that any violation of an international obligation 
which has caused damage carries with it the obligation to provide adequate reparation for it” in 
issuing decisions regarding compensation.102 
 
In the ECHR-context, given the silence of the Convention, there was stringent need for clarification 
through the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR. Thus, the Court noted that protection offered by property 
rights would be “largely illusory and ineffective” in the absence of compensation..103 In the 
jurisprudence of the ECrtHR since the 1980s, it has therefore become generally accepted that in 
cases of deprivation, compensation is implicitly required. As Theo van Banning observes, since both 
deprivation and control are forms of limiting the right to property, “ideally there should not be a 
substantial difference” between the two, nonetheless in “actual practice there is a strong tradition 
whereby deprivation normally leads to compensation and control does not lead to 
compensation.”104 Nonetheless, in Chassagnou v. France, a case dealing with control, while assessing 




 In the Modise case, for example, the Commission found a violation of the right to property, but it did not address its 
content because the Government of Botswana had not refuted the allegation of having confiscated belongings and 
property of Mr. Modise. For the Commission: “It is trite law that where facts go uncontested by a party, in this case, the 
Respondent State, such would be taken as given”.
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 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare 
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 Ibid, para 219. 
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proportionality the Court noted the lack of adequate compensation and went on to find a violation 
of the right to property.105  
 
Having seen that compensation has become an integral part of the proportionality test in respect to 
property rights106, even in the absence of an express mentioning in the ECHR, the standards 
according to which the level of compensation is established must be addressed. In this context, 
Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom is a relevant case, which helps frame the discussion. The 
case concerns the nationalization of certain interests of several ship and aircraft building companies 
by the UK government. The applicant companies did not contest the legitimate aim of the 
nationalization, however they claimed that the received compensation was “grossly inadequate” 
and that they had been victims of breaches of [inter alia] Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.107 The British 
Government had decided upon a compensation system that valued the applicants’ shares by 
reference to their value three years prior to the date of the actual transfer of shares; it was reckoned 
that such a system of compensation would avoid a value that could be artificially affected by the 
knowledge of the nationalization.108 In respect to this reasoning the Court made some important 
findings: 
The taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value would 
normally constitute a disproportionate interference which could not be considered justifiable 
under Article 1 (P1-1). Article 1 (P1-1) does not, however, guarantee a right to full 
compensation in all circumstances, since legitimate objectives of “public interest”, such as 
pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social 
justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.109 
 
It follows thus, that the market value, or to be precise, “an amount reasonably related” to this value, 
is the general standard according to which compensation in cases involving taking of property ought 
to be paid. Nonetheless, as the Court clearly specified, full compensation is not a guaranteed 
right.110 Pursuing economic reform or greater social justice may qualify as legitimate measures of 
general interest which may require less than the reimbursement of the full market price of the 
property at stake. This interpretation, which acknowledges the important social function property 
plays within societies, is coherent with earlier and later judgments of the European Court.111  
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Moreover, the Court asserts that the standard of compensation may vary depending on the nature 
of the property and the circumstances of the taking and that the wide margin of appreciation which 
the State enjoys applies to the assessment weather the deprivation of property is in the public 
interest as well as to the terms of compensation.112  
 
Another important aspect relevant to the level of compensation debate, which received attention in 
Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, refers to the “general principles of international law”. 
The applicants claimed that the express mention in the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to 
the general principles of international law meant that the international law requirement of “prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation for the deprivation of property of foreigners also applied to 
nationals.”113 The European judges, building on previous case law and the travaux préparatoires, 
firmly asserted their view that “the principles in question are not applicable to a taking by a State of 
the property of its own nationals”, but “solely to non-nationals”.114 According to the official record 
then “the general principles of international law, in their present connotation, entailed the 
obligation to pay compensation to non-nationals in cases of expropriation”.115  
 
A manual on compensation in international investment law observes that the compatibility of the 
European Court’s jurisprudence with the disputes heard by investment tribunals is “somehow 
limited” by the preponderance in the ECrtHR of cases brought by nationals against their own 
States.116 However, the authors – in a statement echoing the need to stop or rather limit the 
fragmentation of the international legal system – acknowledge the potential of the ECHR as an 
international legal instrument and of the interpretation given to it by the European Court “to inform 
international dispute settlement generally”.117 
 
The attempt to disclose the general principles of international law in relation to the standards of 
compensation118 should begin by recalling the 1928 Chorzów Factory Case, so often cited by 
tribunals in cases of deprivation of property of foreign nationals and companies. The case decided 
upon by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) concerned the Polish unlawful 
expropriation of German-owned industrial property within Poland. According to the Court, the 
principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to 
international law are the following: 
[R]eparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to 
the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it.119  
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The PCIJ distinguishes between lawful and unlawful expropriation, while outlining the requirement 
of full compensation in the context of an illegal taking of property. This historic distinction has been 
taken over by the International Law Commission in its work in codifying international law in respect 
to compensation required as a consequence of expropriation. In this sense, the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility deal with takings amounting to wrongful acts of states and explicitly exclude 
lawful expropriations.120 
 
The remaining debate then refers to the standard of compensation, or in other words how much 
compensation should be awarded, in cases of lawful deprivation of property. In the 1930s already, 
the PCIJ standard has been extrapolated to cases of legal takings, termed as the “Hull formula” and 
seen as equivalent121 to the “prompt, adequate and effective” requirement.122 The strongest 
contestation of the Hull formula came during the 1960s and 1970s. Most States that emerged from 
the process of decolonization expressed their “permanent sovereignty over natural resources *…+ 
primarily through large-scale nationalization of mineral extraction facilities, the renegotiation of 
existing arrangements and the creation of state enterprises and numerous commodity producer 
associations.”123 A series of UN General Assembly resolutions which were promoted and strongly 
supported by developing and socialist States are evidence of the conceptual rift that emerged in 
relation to the applicable standard of compensation. In 1962, resolution 1803 on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources affirmed the right to nationalize foreign owned property and 
required the nationalizing State to pay “appropriate compensation”:124  
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of 
public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely 
individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be 
paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such 
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law.125 
 
The vagueness of the term “appropriate” and the requirement that compensation be attributed in 
accordance with international law are said to have made consensus in the General Assembly 
possible at that time.126 However, already then two divergent positions had become evident. 
Developed countries maintained that “appropriate” was to be interpreted according to traditional 
principles of international law and hence the Hull formula. Developing States insisted that it ought to 
be read in the light of relevant circumstances and compensation should be awarded in accordance 
to the national law of the expropriating State (the Calvo doctrine).127 The 1974 Charter of Economic 
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Rights and Duties of States while employing the term “appropriate” left out any reference to the 
need for compensation to be paid in accordance with international law.128 The resolution aiming to 
establish a New International Economic Order represented in fact the peak of the disagreement 
between the North and the South on the issue of the standard of compensation. While it had been 
portrayed as a rejection of international law by some authors129, de Arechaga notes that this 
description of the General Assembly resolution 3281 is “not entirely accurate”: 
Though expelled through the door because of its alleged identification with the doctrine of 
“prompt, adequate and effective compensation”, *international law+ has come back through 
the window in the garb of an equitable principle which takes into account the specific 
circumstances of each case and is more likely to be of assistance in the settlement of 
investment disputes through negotiation or, if the parties so agree, through adjudication.130 
 
In Texaco v. Libya, the arbitrator, while asserting that by virtue of the consensual nature of 
resolution 1803 “appropriate compensation” had become the new customary standard, dismissed 
the resolution 3281 as de lege feranda.131 Given the lack of a general and consistent State practice 
and the divergence within doctrine, it is rather difficult to hold the “appropriate compensation” 
requirement as it has been interpreted by developing countries as the customary principle in 
relation to compensation. Nonetheless, it would be equally difficult – in the presence of strong 
opposition from developing States – to hold the traditional requirement of “prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation” as a continued expression of customs. What can be noted however is the 
“large degree of flexibility and discretion” which the “appropriate compensation” formula grants to 
arbitrators “allowing them to rely on various considerations including equity, balanced outcome, 
capacity of a State to pay”.132 
 
The post-Cold War period has seen a tremendous increase in bilateral investment treaties, the 
majority of which are said to contain reference to the “adequate” standard as part of the Hull 
formula, which thus call for compensation equivalent to the market value.133 However, it is also 
noted that some treaties include specific mention of “just” and/or “equitable” compensation, which 
hence suggest the possibility of tribunals to take other circumstance into account during 
arbitration.134 Sergey Ripinsky and Kevin Williams recommend caution while inferring from the 
current proliferation of bilateral investment treaties and their preference for the Hull formula the 
clear return to the traditional general principle of “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” 
assessed on the basis of market value of the expropriated investment. They conclude that 
“customary international law is not fully settled on the issue of compensation for lawful 
expropriation”.135 
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3.5. Correlative States’ Obligations 
 
The jurisprudence of the main three regional judicial bodies is consistent with the fact that both 
“negative and positive” obligations of States arise under the respective Conventions in respect to 
property rights. 
 
The “negative” duty of the State to respect the right to property amounts to an abstention of 
interference with the right. In the European system, State actions such as expropriation, de jure or 
de facto, temporary seizure of property, destruction of property, rent controls, and planning 
restrictions have been held, under certain circumstances, to represent a breach of the obligation to 
respect the right to property.136  
 
In recent years, the ECrtHR has also dealt with several cases where it found that “the genuine, 
effective exercise of the right protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not depend merely on 
the State’s duty not to interfere, but may give rise to positive obligations”.137 Öneryildiz v. Turkey is 
an illustrative example. The applicants lived in a slum quarter in Istanbul built without authorization 
next to a rubbish tip. An expert report pointed to the fact that the tip represented a danger for the 
slum inhabitants in the absence of measures preventing a methane explosion. In 1993, a methane 
explosion occurred, which killed nine close relatives and destroyed the house of the applicants. In 
respect to the right to property, the ECrtHR stated: 
In the Court’s view, the resulting infringement amounts not to “interference” but to the 
breach of a positive obligation, since the State officials and authorities did not do everything 
within their power to protect the applicant’s proprietary interests.138  
 
In its jurisprudence, the Court has also held that the positive obligation of States to protect property 
rights continues to exist in cases involving litigation between private entities. For example, States are 
required to take concrete measures to put in place a judicial mechanism for settling effectively 
property disputes and to ensure that such a mechanism complies with the material and procedural 
safeguards enshrined in the Convention.139  
 
Although the ECrtHR does not acknowledge a right to acquire property140, in James and Others v. the 
United Kingdom the Court employs language that resonates with the States’ obligation to fulfill. The 
applicants in this case were trustees of the estate of the Duke of Westminster who owned a large 
number of houses in London. They complained that they lost a considerable amount of money as a 
result of the implementation of the Leasehold Reform Act, which gave tenants with lease of 21 years 
the possibility to buy the houses under the market price. In short, the ECrtHR granted a wide margin 
of appreciation to the Government both in respect to the aim and to the measures undertaken to 
secure the aim, based on the following reasoning: 
Eliminating what are judged to be social injustices is an example of the functions of a 
democratic legislature. More especially, modern societies consider housing of the population 
to be a prime social need, the regulation of which cannot entirely be left to the play of 
market forces. The margin of appreciation is wide enough to cover legislation aimed at 
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securing greater social justice in the sphere of people’s homes, even where such legislation 
interferes with existing contractual relations between private parties and confers no direct 
benefit on the State or the community at large.141   
 
In its important decision in the Awas Tingni case, the IACrtHR clearly took the position that a State 
has both negative and positive obligations under the relevant provisions of the ACHR. The Court 
found that the Awas Tingni indigenous community “has the right that the Nicaraguan State carry out 
the delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the territory”142, which indeed amounts to a positive 
State obligation.  
 
In the African continent, the Ogoni case deserves particular attention for the integrated approach 
that the African Commission took, also in respect of the correlative State’s obligations. The 
complaint alleged that the military Government of Nigeria has been directly involved in oil 
production through the State oil company in a consortium with Shell Petroleum Development 
Corporation (SPDC), whose activities in the Ogoni region caused environmental contamination, 
health problems and a climate of terror. The communication lodged by two non-governmental 
organizations on behalf of the Ogoni people alleged violations of many articles of the AfCHPR, 
including Article 14 (right to property) and Article 21 (right of peoples to freely dispose of their 
wealth and natural resources). It was further alleged that the Government condoned and facilitated 
the violations by placing the legal and military authorities at the disposal of the company. Moreover, 
the Nigerian security forces allegedly contributed to the violations by attacking and burning villages 
and homes. It was alleged that the State failed to investigate and punish the perpetrators. After 
making appeal to foreign case-law, the African Commission emphasized the duty of States to protect 
their citizens “not only through appropriate legislation and effective enforcement but also by 
protecting them from damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private parties”.143 It then 
continued, stating the following: 
The Commission notes that in the present case, despite its obligation to protect persons 
against interferences in the enjoyment of their rights, the Government of Nigeria facilitated 
the destruction of the Ogoniland. Contrary to its Charter obligations and despite such 
internationally established principles, the Nigerian Government has given the green light to 
private actors, and the oil Companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being of 
the Ogonis. By any measure of standards, its practice falls short of the minimum conduct 
expected of governments, and therefore, is in violation of Article 21 of the African Charter.144 
 
In its most recent decision involving the property rights of the Endorois indigenous community, the 
African Commission analyzed the usual framework of States obligations – respect, protect, fulfill – 
and made a case for the legality and indeed the requirement to, in certain circumstance, redress 
imbalances through positive discrimination or affirmative action.145   
 
To sum up this section on the correlative States’ obligations in respect to the right to property, 
appeal will be made to another emblematic statement of the African Commission:  
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[A]ll rights-both civil and political rights and social and economic-generate at least four levels 
of duties for a State that undertakes to adhere to a rights regime, namely the duty to 
respect, protect, promote, and fulfil these rights. These obligations universally apply to all 




THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND THE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
 
 
As the 1993 report of the Independent Expert “on the right of everyone to own property alone as 
well as in association with others” points out, the right to property is not an isolated right, but one 
which is instrumental in “enhancing both personal dignity and fostering socio-economic well-
being.”147 Jurisprudence of regional bodies appears to support this claim. Three economic, social and 
cultural rights will be addressed in the remainder of this paper in connection to the right to 
property: the right to housing, the right to food and the right to social security. 
 
4.1. The Right to Property and the Right to Housing 
 
The link between property and housing is indeed so obvious that it requires little explanation. The 
ECrtHR has produced abundant case-law on the right to property as a means of protecting one’s 
house.148 Similarly, the Inter-American Commission and the Court dealt with confiscation of houses 
under Article 21.149 The African Commission too has addressed the protection of one’s house as part 
of the right to property.150  
 
The use of property rights as a means to further the right to housing, or indeed to obtain redress for 
violations of housing rights, is perhaps best illustrated by cases related to forced evictions. In Doǧan 
and Others v. Turkey, the applicants complained that their forced eviction from their village in South-
Eastern Turkey by security forces and the refusal of the authorities to allow them to return to their 
homes and land represents a violation of their property rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol 1.151 
The European Court, “in the view of the security motives by the Government”, left open the 
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question regarding the lawfulness of the interference.152 The ECrtHR concluded that the applicants 
had to bear an “excessive burden which has upset the fair balance which should be struck between 
the requirements of the general interest and the protection of the right to the peaceful enjoyment 
of one’s possessions.”153 In reaching its conclusion, the Court highlighted in particular the Principles 
18 and 28 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.154 The former principle requires 
the authorities to provide internally displaced persons with, and ensure access to, inter alia, basic 
shelter and housing, as a component of an adequate standard of living. Principle 28 refers to 
procedural requirements, such as the consultation with and the full participation of displaced 
persons in the authorities’ attempt to resettle and reintegrate them.  
 
Similarly, the African Commission takes a strict stance while asserting that forced evictions “cannot 
be deemed to satisfy Article 14 of the Charter’s test of being done ‘in accordance with the law’ *…+ 
[w]here such removal was forced, this would in itself suggest that the ‘proportionality’ test has not 
been satisfied.”155 In the recent Endorois case, it reached this conclusion while making reference to 
standards outlined by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General 
Comment 4 on the right to housing and General Comment 7 on evictions and the right to housing.156   
 
In the jurisprudence of the African system, the Ogoni case presents particular interest for the 
current opinion, given the integrated approach embraced by the Commission to allow for a greater 
protection of economic and social rights. The African Commission expressly asserted that the right to 
shelter or housing – not mentioned by the Charter – can be distinguished from the “combined 
effects” of Article 14, 16 and 18. In the words of the Commission: 
*T+he ‘corollary of the combination of the provisions protecting the right to enjoy the best 
attainable state of mental and physical health, (…) the right to property, and the protection 
accorded to the family forbids the wanton destruction of shelter because when housing is 
destroyed, property, health, and family life are adversely affected.’157 
 
The African Commission went on to assert massive violations of the right to shelter “under Article 14 
and implicitly recognized by Article 16 and 18(1)”.158  
 
Adding another dimension to the link between property and housing, Krause suggests that positive 
measures, which are related to the duty to fulfill the right to housing, might be in conflict with a 
strong protection of the right to property.159 According to the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR, measures 
related to rent legislation or the possibility of acquiring a previously leased house at advantageous 
prices, promoted by the State in order to achieve greater social justice and fulfill the right to 
housing, have been accepted by the Court as having legitimate aims. In Mellacher and others v. 
Austria, the applicants who owned several flats rented to tenants complained that the 
implementation of legislation that resulted in a reduction of the rent infringed their right to property 
under Article 1 of Protocol No.1. The ECrtHR found that the aim of the interference was legitimate 
and the measure proportionate: 
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The Court observes that, in remedial social legislation and in particular in the field of rent 
control, which is the subject of the present case, it must be open to the legislature to take 
measures affecting the further execution of previously concluded contracts in order to attain 
the aim of the policy adopted.160 
 
It thus appears that the Court is prepared to grant large discretion to States when they exercise their 
obligation to limit the right to property to fulfill the right to housing. 
 
4.2. The Right to Property and the Right to Food   
 
Unquestionably, there is an intrinsic link between property, land and food. It is this link, which the 
African Commission emphasized in the Ogoni case, which makes the right to property and the right 
to food intimately interdependent.  
 
On the issue of land property rights functioning as a means to realize the right to food, the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission and the Court is particularly relevant. In 1996, after 
having been unsuccessful in their attempt to regain their ancestral land, which was also an 
important source for their food, the Enxet-Lamenxay and Kayleyphapopyet (Riachito) communities 
filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission alleging violations of the rights to judicial 
protection, fair trial, property, residence and the benefits of culture under the ACHR.161 In 1998, a 
friendly settlement agreement was signed, under which the State committed itself to purchasing 
approximately 22,000 hectares in the Paraguayan Chaco region, returning them to the communities 
and providing the deeds of ownership. The State also guaranteed to provide food, sanitary and 
educational assistance.162  
 
In other cases, the IACrtHR interpreted Article 21 of the Convention in light of the economic, social, 
and cultural rights of indigenous communities.163 On numerous occasions, it interpreted the right to 
property of indigenous peoples as requiring a positive obligation of the State to delimitate and 
demarcate the land, and protect the communal rights to property, to allow them to provide for their 
own means of subsistence.164 The Yakye Axa165 and the Sawhoyamaxa166 cases are emblematic to 
present the evolutionary approach of the Court. In the latter case, the Sawhoyamaxa indigenous 
community, being denied its right to its ancestral lands, was forced to live in appalling conditions 
with limited access to food. As a consequence of these conditions, 31 members of the community, 
among them many children, died.167 As a general principle, the Court asserted that “*t]he right to life 
is a fundamental human right, which full enjoyment is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of the other 
human rights. If this right is not respected, all other rights do not have sense.”168 After looking into 
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whether Paraguay has adopted “the necessary measures within the scope of its authority which 
could be reasonably expected to prevent or avoid the risk to the right to life of the alleged 
victims”169 the Court found that: 
[A]lthough the State did not take them to the side of the road, it is also true it did not adopt 
the adequate measures, through a quick and efficient administrative proceeding, to take 
them away and relocate them within their ancestral lands, where they could have used and 
enjoyed their natural resources, which resources are directly related to their survival capacity 
and the preservation of their ways of life. 170 
 
At the end of its reasoning, the Court concluded that Paraguay violated several articles of the ACHR, 
including Article 4(1) on the right to life and Article 21 on the right to property. 
 
The aim of this section was to analyze cases of property rights that have served to further the right 
to food. In this context, it is appropriate to recall the recent attempt made by the Special Rapporteur 
on the right to food at guiding large-scale land acquisition and leases by proposing a set of principles 
that would bring land property purchases in accordance with the right to food and other human 
rights.171  
 
4.3. The Right to Property and the Right to Social Security 
 
Litigation in respect to the right to property has also been started as a route to enforce different 
dimensions of the right to social security, with a particular emphasis on pensions. In the past, the 
European Commission had held that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee a right to 
pension, but went on to assert that the compulsory contribution to a pension fund may in certain 
circumstances create a property right in a portion of the fund.172 This condition had given rise to 
serious complexities.173 More recently, in a crucial decision, the ECrtHR refuted this approach and 
stated that there are no grounds upon which to draw a distinction between contributory and non-
contributory benefits for the purposes of the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.174 In the case 
at hand, Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom, a complaint had been brought under the right to 
property provision of the First Protocol in conjunction with Article 14 of the ECHR, prohibiting inter 
alia sex-discrimination. In addition to renouncing to the differentiation doctrine between 
contributory and non-contributory schemes, the Court made another major assertion. Whereas 
pension or other social benefits cannot be implied, as such, under the right to property in the 
European system, the ECrtHR held that if a State has a legislation in force providing for the payment 
of a welfare benefit as a right, “that legislation must be regarded as generating a proprietary interest 
falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements.”175 In 
Moskal v. Poland, in 2009, the Court upheld its reasoning and clarified that a pension right claim 
which is not brought in connection with Article 14, but only as an alleged interference of the 
property rights alone, is admissible. And it concluded that Article 1 was violated.176  
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In the Five Pensioners Case, the IACrtHR concluded that the right to a pension existed since it has 
been recognized by the Peruvian Constitution and it had been incorporated in the patrimoine of the 
persons. In this sense, “Article 21 (Right to Property) of the Convention protects the right of the five 
pensioners to receive an equalized retirement pension in accordance with Decree Law No. 
20530”.177 The Court went on to discuss the aim of the interference and found it legitimate under 
Article 21 and Article 5 of the San Salvador Protocol, but it asserted that the measures taken by the 
State were arbitrary because it did not execute administrative procedures with full respect for the 
appropriate guarantees and it did not comply with the judicial rulings arising from their applications 
for protective measures.178 
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The right to property has been enshrined as a human right in international law – both conventional 
and customary – through universal and regional treaties and national constitutions. The right to 
property recognizes everyone’s right to peacefully enjoy their property, be it comprised of existing 
possessions or assets acquired by law or claims which raise a legitimate expectation of obtaining 
effective enjoyment. The right protects individual property, as well as, at least in the case of the 
Inter-American and African systems, communal property. Limitations of the right are permissible, 
provided that they respect the principles of legality and proportionality and that they are directed 
towards assuring or advancing the public or general interest. Human rights law recognizes both 





The payment of compensation in cases of deprivation is a requirement of customary international 
law. However, the standard according to which compensation is to be awarded remains debated.  In 
the view of the authors of this paper, the standard should reflect all branches of international law 
relevant to the subject-matter, including investment law and human rights law. Moreover, the 
customary standard of compensation ought to be coherent with the functions fulfilled by the right to 
property with respect to the individual and society at large. 
 
5.2. Right to Property 
 
The right to property is essential for the protection of human life and dignity of the right holder as it 
contributes to the realization of economic and social rights including the right to housing, to food 
and to social security. On the other hand, given the inherent social function of the right to property, 
this right may be limited in order to resolve social injustices and advance the economic, social and 
cultural rights of specific disadvantaged individuals or groups.179 
 
5.3. Obligation to Respect the Right to Property 
 
The obligation to respect the right to property requires that States refrain from arbitrarily interfering 
with the enjoyment of the right. Expropriation without legal basis or not in the public interest is an 
example of a violation of the obligation to respect the right to property.  
 
5.4. Obligation to Protect the Right to Property 
 
The obligation to protect the right to property requires States to take all necessary measures 
including legislative, administrative and judicial, to prevent encroachment by third parties. The 
failure to protect individuals against expulsion from or destruction of their property, or the failure to 
delimitate and demarcate the communal land of indigenous people, could amount to a violation of 
the right to property.  
 




 See for example, ECrtHR, James and others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 8793/79, Judgment of 21 February 
1986, para 47. 
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5.6. Obligation to Fulfil the Right to Property 
 
The obligation to fulfil the right to property requires States to undertake positive steps, legislative 
and otherwise, to create an enabling environment.180  For example, in a country characterized by 
extreme inequalities in access to property, failure of the State to take corrective measures could 
represent a violation of the obligation to fulfil the right to property. 
                                                          
 
180
 See for example, South African Constitution of 1996, Art. 25(5) 
 






African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on 
behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, Communication No. 276 / 2003, May 2009, 
para 209 
 John K. Modise v. Botswana, Communication No. 97/93, 2000 
 Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania Communication nos. 54/91, 61/91, 
98/93, 164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98, 2000 
 Social and Economic Rights Action Center & the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. 
Nigeria, Communication 155/96, 27 May 2002 
 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
 Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, Application nos. 99/1995/605/693, Judgment of 1 April 1998 
 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal Application no. 73049/01, Judgment of 11 January 2007 
 Broniowski v. Poland Application no. 31443/96, Judgment of 22 June 2004 
 Brumărescu v. Romania Application no. 28342/95, Judgment of 28 October 1999 
 Case of Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany Application no. 42527/98, 
Judgment of 12 July 2001 
 Chassagnou v. France, Applications nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, Judgment of 29 
April 1999 
 Doǧan and Others v. Turkey, Application nos. 8803-8811/02, 8813/02 and 8815-8819/02, 
Judgment as rectified on 18 November 2004 
 Former King of Greece and others v. Greece, Application no. 25701/94, Judgment of 23 
November 2000 
 Handyside v. The United Kingdom Application no. 5493/72, Judgment of 7 December 1976 
 Iatridis v. Greece Application no. 31107/96, Judgment of 25 March 1999 
 Ihsan Bilgin v. Turkey, Application no. 23819/94, Judgment of 16 November 2000 
 James and others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 8793/79, Judgment of 21 February 
1986 
 Kopecký v. Slovakia Application No. 44912/98, Judgment of 28 September 2004 
 Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 9006/80; 9262/81; 
9263/81;9265/81; 9266/81; 9313/81; 9405/81, Judgment of 8 July 1986 
 Malhous v. the Czech Republic Application no. 33071/96, Decision of 13 December 2000 
 Maltzan and others v. Germany Applications nos. 71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02, 
Decision of 2 March 2005 
 Marckx v. Belgium Application no. 6833/74, Judgment of 13 June 1979 
 Moskal v. Poland Application no. 10373/05, Judgment of 15 September 2009 
 Öneryıldız v. Turkey Application no. 48939/99, Judgment of 30 November 2004 
 Sierpioski v. Poland Application no. 38016/07, Judgment of 3 November 2009 
 Slivenko and Others v. Latvia Application no. 48321/99, Decision of 23 January 2002 
 Sporrong and Lönnroth Application no. 7151/75; 7152/75 Judgment of 23 September 1982 
 Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom, Applications nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, Decision 
of 6 July 2005 
 Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden Application no. 10873/84, Judgment of 07 July 1989 
 Van der Mussele v. Belgium Application no. 8919/80, Judgment of 23 November 1983 
Legal Opinion: The Right to Property from a Human Rights Perspective 31 
 
 
 Van Marle and Others v. The Netherlands Application no. 8543/79, 8674/79, 8675/79, 
8685/79, Judgment of 26 June 1986 
 Viaşu c. Roumanie Requête no. 75951/01 de 9 décembre 2008 




Human Rights Committee  
 Graciela Ato del Avellanal v. Peru, Communication No. 202/1986, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40, 
A/44/40, at 196, 1988 
 
 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
 Enxet-Lamenxay and Kayleyphapopyet (Riachito), Case no. 11.713. Report No. 90/999 
 “Five Pensioners” v. Peru, Judgment of 28 February 2003 
 Comunidad Moiwana v. Suriname, Sentencia, 15 de junio de 2005 
 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001 
 Saramaka People. v. Suriname, Judgment of 28 November 2007 
 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 29 March 2006 
 Sonia Arce Esparza v. Chile, Case 71/01, Report No. 59/03 
 The Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 17 June 2005 
 
 
Investment Arbitration Tribunals 
 Ebrahimi, Shahin Shain v. Islamic Republic of Iran (‘Ebrahimi v. Iran’), 30 Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal 170, 1994 
 Libyan American Oil Company v. Libyan Arab Republic (‘LIAMCO v. Libya’), 62 ILR 140, 1977 
 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v. Libyan Arab Republic (‘Texaco v. Libya’), 53 ILR 389, 1973 
 
 
Permanent Court of International Justice  
 The Factory at Chorzów, Germany v. Poland, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series 
A, No. 17 
 
 
